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Determining Discount Rates for Valuing
Properties in Distressed Industries
BY HAL B. HEATON, PHD

I

n recent years, several industries, such
as telecommunications, merchant
utilities, airlines, and others, have been
through intense periods of distress during which many participants entered
bankruptcy or underwent other major
reorganizations. The severe price drops
and swings in the share prices and debt
securities of these industries make estimating cost of capital very difficult.
This study addresses the procedure
for determining discount rates for
properties in industries under stress. A
simple example with fixed and variable'
costs, which could represent a company
in any of these industries, is used to
demonstrate the difficulties of using
standard approaches for estimating cost
of capital.
In distressed circumstances, valuation
methodologies such as the cost approach and the stock and debt approach
become very unreliable. The income
approach becomes the most dependable because it is the only one that uses
the ability to obtain financing as the key
assumption. Value is usually defined as

the price between a willing buyer and a
willing seller; thus, the ability of a potential buyer to obtain financing is critical
to any transaction.
With distressed properties, the appraiser must first make a credible forecast of
the cash flows that a particular property
will be able to obtain under the circumstances. Forecasting cash flows is critical
because they determine how much and
what type of financing is available to a
potential purchaser of the property.
Once the cash flow forecast has been
made, the appraiser must use market
data to estimate the amount and the cost
of debt that would likely be available.
Data from publicly traded companies in
the distressed industry are not much help
because they reflect financing obtained
in better times. Once the amount and
the cost of debt have been determined,
the appraiser must estimate the return
that an equity investor would require
given the amount of debt.
In addition, for distressed industries,
once these estimates have been made,
the appraiser must use an iterative
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process to check and adjust them. The
iterative process is necessary since it
is difficult to make direct estimates of
financing amounts and costs. In the iterative process, the appraiser first estimates
the necessary parameters, detennines
a value under those assumptions, and
then checks the assumptio1').8 using the
value to determine whether the estimates
are reasonable. A simplified example
follows.
Example of Distressed Property:
Normal Circumstances
Suppose that under normal circumstances a property makes 1 million widgets per
yeal" at a variable cost of $8.33 per unit
and a fixed cost of $25 million and sells
them for $50 per unit. A widget simply
represents any product or service: for an
electlic utility it might represent a megawatt of power; for an airline, a seat on a
given flight route; for a telecommunications company, a 10-minute call.
Suppose tilat in normal circumsta1lces
tile company can finance itselfwitil 50%
debt and 50% equity; debt costs 10%;
and equity investors require 14% at tile
50/50 debt/equity ratio. Under these
conditions, tile weighted average cost of
capital ("VACC) is:

WACC=
Wd X ki1- T) + w. X k. =
.5 X 10%(1-.4) +.5 X 14% =
10%
where Wd represents the weighting on
debt, we tile weighting on equity, kd tile
cost of debt, he the cost of equity, and T
tile tax rate of 40% (in tins eXalnple).
Under tilese assumptions tile company
produces net operating profits after
taxes (NOPAT) of $10 million per year
(see table 1).
Under the simplifying assumptions
tilat tile depreciation included in fixed
costs equals tile incremental capital expenditures and working capital needs
alld tilat tile NOPAT is expected to be
constant on average in tile future, tile
value of this property is $10 million
54

NOPAT/.10 = $100 million. If the industry is competitive, tilen tile cost approach
should lead to the same $100 million
value. If tile assets could be created for
less tilan $100 million, tilen new entrallts
would enter tile industry and drive tile
price down until value equals tile cost
of entering the industry. If the assets
were to cost more than $100 million, no
new competitors would enter or some
existing competitors would exit and
tile remaining competitors would raise
prices until they wer,e compensated for
their total costs.
Alternatively, if tile industry is regulated, tilen regulators would presumably
set rates such tilat competitors would be
compensated for tile total cost. As a result, for tilis study, it is assumed tilat tile
cost approach to value also yields $100
million in normal circumsta1lces.
Also important to tins analysis is some
estimate of tile volatility or uncertainty
of tile NOPAT forecast to establish tile
amount of risk tilat potential investors
would evaluate to determine appropliate
discount rates. It is simple to demonstrate that a 1 % change in price (a
change from $50 to $50.50 or to $49.50)
swings bOtil NOPAT and value by 3%.
This tilree times_(3%/1 % = 3) volatility
serves as tile base measure of lisle.
Example of Distressed Property:
Price Fall
"WJJat happens to value if the industry
starts to experience stress and only
the price falls? Usually both quantity
and price are affected by an industry
downturn, but it is helpful to look at the
Table 1.

Item
Revenue [$50 X 1 m widgets]
Fixed Costs
Variable Costs [$8.33 X 1mJ
EBIT
Taxes [40% x EBIT]
NOPAT

($ thousands)
$50,000
25,000
8,333
16,667

6,667
10,000
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effect of each variable in isolation before
considering the example of both a price
and quantity collapse.
Suppose the price falls by 20% from
$50 to $40 per unit. Some appraisers may
attempt to aQjust for value by adjusting
the cost approach for economic obsolescence. One such approach would be
to look at the 20% fall in revenues and
simply reduce value by 20%:

a 3% change in NOPAT and value. Risk
(volatility) doubles! As a result, investors
demand rates higher than 10% and value
falls more than 60%.

Example of Distressed Property:
Quantity Fall
As mentioned before, usually in distressed indusmes both price and quantity
fall. It is helpful to look at the effect of a
$100 million cost"': 20% x $100 $80 million.
fall in quantity, holding everything else
This adjustment seriously underesti- constant.
Suppose quantity falls by 10%. Again,
mates the effect of a downturn on value.
some
appraisers might mistal{.enly think
The fixed-versus-variable-cost makeup
that
this
represents a 10% economic
of the expenses increases (or leverages)
obsolescence
factor and that value has
the effect of the drop in revenues on
fallen
by
only
10%:
net profits. This effect is referred to as
$100
million
cost-10% for economic
operating leverage.
obsolescence
= $90 million value.
To understand the total effect on value,
Again, the operating leverage inherent
the effect of the price fall on profits must
in
the business makes this a substantial
be computed. The revenue drop leads to
understatement
of the effect on value.
a NOPAT of $4,000 (see table 2).
To
determine
the
effect on value, the
If this revenue drop is considered pereffect
of
the
10%
decline in quantity
manent, the perpetuity formula can be
on
profitability
must
be calculated (see
used as before to estimate value. If the
table
3).
same 10% cost of capital were used (erAssuming that this fall in quantity is
roneously), it might be concluded that
permanent,
value drops by 25% even
value has dropped to
if the 10% cost of capital remains un$4 million NOPAT/10% =$40 million,
changed:
which is a 60% drop in value, not a 20%
$7,500/10% = $75 million.
drop. Unfortunately, the effect on value
As with a price fall, this adjustment
is even more severe because the cost of
seriously
understates the true drop in
capital has increased due to increased
the fall in quantity has
value
because
lisk. The increased risk stems from the
made
this
a
much
more volatile and
fact that margins are much smaller;
risky
business
with
thinner
margins. A
hence a 1 % change in price from the
in
price
under
the
10% fall
1
%
change
new $40 price leads to a 6 % change in
in
quantity
leads
to
a
3.6%
change
in
NOPAT and value. Under normal cir:..
value,
which
is
a
more
volatile
earnings
cumstances a 1 % change leads to only

=

Table 2.

Item
Revenue [$40 x 1 m widgets]
Fixed Costs
Variable Costs [$8.33 x 1m]
EBIT

($ thousands)
$40,000
25,000
8,333
6,667

Table 3.

Item
Revenue [$50 x.9 mwidgets]
Fixed Costs
Variable Costs [$8.33 x .9 m]
EBIT

($ thousands)
$45,000
25,000
7,500
12,500

Taxes [40% x EBIT]

2,667

Taxes [40% x EBIT]

5,000

NOPAT

4,000

NOPAT

7,500
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s1Team. Hence investors require a higher
rate of return and value drops even more
than 25%.
Example of Distressed Property:
Both Price and Quantity Fall
Having determined the effect of a price
fall and a quantity fall individually, we
must investigate the more common effect in a distressed industry of both a
price and quantity fall.
Sometimes the market capitalization
of a company in an industry is measured
~y the equity market capitalization (price
tunes number of shares outstanding)
plus the book value of debt. Although
the market value of debt should be used,
de bt is not often publicly traded and
so the market value of the debt cannot
be directly obtained. AB a result, many
appraisers make the assumption that
the book value of debt is a reasonable
estimate of the market value of debt.
This assumption is a serious mistake for
a company in a distressed industry.
Consider trying to value tl1e company
above when price falls [Tom $50 to $45
and quantity falls from 1,000,000 to
900,000 widgets. NOPAT falls to $4.8 million under tl1is scenario (see table 4).
Even iftl1e old 10% WACCwere used
value falls to less tl1al1 $50 million, whicl~
is less tl1an tl1e face amount oftl1e debt.
However, under tl1ese assumptions, risk
~ncr~ases dramatically: a 1 % change
111 pnce now results in a 5% change in
NOPAT and value. Because of tl1is dramatic increase in volatility compal"ed to
tl1at in normal times, investors require
even higher rates of retun1.
Table 4.

Item
Revenue [$40 x .9 mwidgets]
Fixed Costs
Variable Costs [$8.33 x .9 m]
EBIT

($ thousands)
$40,500
25,000
7,500
8,000

Taxes [40% x EBlll

3,200

NOPAT

4,800
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·Why does equity have any value at all
when the value of the asset is less than
the face amount of debt outstanding? AB .
long as the company does not declare
banhuptcy, tl1e equity is very much like
an out-of-tl1e-money call option.
Call options cannot be valued by using
standard discounted-cash-flow analysis.
Call options are typically valued with
formulas derived under different sets of
assumptions that exploit arbitrage relationships between leveraged positions in
tl1e underlying stock and the call option.
The Black-Scholes formula (Black and
Scholes 1973) is onewell-lmownformula
for valuing stock options.
Equity value stays positive even for
distressed indusuies because equity investors have limited dovvnside risk. Jl.J.st
like investors in call options, investors in
equities can lose only tl1eir investJ.nent.
In contrast, investors in physical assets
tl1at have used debt to purchase tl1e asset witl10ut incorporation are subject to
losses of more tl1an tl1eir equity investment. Debt holders may have tl1e right
to seize otl1er assets held by investors al1d
equity investors may lose even more tl1al1
tl1e equity invested in tl1e asset.
Equity investors in disu"essed companies for which tl1e assets are wortl1 less
tl1an tl1e debt outsta.l1ding al"e essentially
placing a bet similal" to tl1at of al1 outof-tl1e-money call option. For eXalnple,
how much would an investor pay for
tl1e right to buy Dell Computer stock
for $30 about 6 montl1s from no",1 if tl1e
current price of Dell Computer were
$25? Note tl1at tl1e price gain necessary
to compensate for the investJ.nentwould
represent a gain of over 20% in 6 montl1s
or al1 al1nualized return of over 40 %-al1
unlikely event. Still, tl1e current price in
mal"kets today (June 2006) for this call
option is $.70. Much, if not most, of tl1e
time, deep out-of-the-money options
e:l...1)ire wortl11ess.
Why would investors buy tl1em? The
al1Swer is tl1e limited downside. The most
tl1e investor call10se in tl1e case of tl1e Dell
option is$. 70. But what if Dell stock were
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to return to the high of over $40 that it
attained about a year ago? The investor
wbuld net over $10 for the $.70 bet.
Similarly, in distressed industries, equity investors pay a (small) positive price
for the equity even though the underlying assets are worth less than the face
amount of the debt outstanding in the
hope (perhaps unlikely) of an industry
recovery.
Also, note that the market value of the
debt for distressed companies is much
less than the f-ace value. In addition, the
standard yield-to-maturity calculations
used to estimate the cost of debt in normal circumstances are no longer reliable
for calculating capital.
For example, Calpine Corporation,
a merchant utility, in 2003 had debt
trading for less than $.45 on the dollar
of face value. A yield-to-maturity calculation on the debt at the time produced
a yield to maturity of over 24%. Is that
the expected return or "cost" of debt at
the time? No. That is the return only if
Calpine does not default on the debt and
it remains in place to maturity-it is not
the expected but rather the promised
rate of return. Clearly investors did not
expect Calpine to pay what was promised
if they were willing to pay only $.45 on
the dollar for the debt.
As a result, the standard yield-to-maturity calculations for debt cannot be used
to estimate cost of debt for distressed industlies. However, for equity investors in
Calpine at the time, the 24% yield does
represent a minimum rate of return.
Because of the seniority of de bt to equity
in bankruptcy, equity investors receive a
payoff only if the debt holders are paid
off first. Hence the equity holders must
require a return in excess of 24%. If they
thought the equity would have any value
in bankruptcy, then they must believe
all debt claims will be satisfied and the
debt investors will receive a 24% rate of
return. The equity investors could buy
the debt claims for the 24% return with
much less risk than the equity claims. As
a result, they must require a return of

more than 24% on the equity.
Another problem in appraising properties in distressed industries stems
from using debt/equity ratios oftraded
companies to estimate the appropriate
debt/ equity ratio for the WACC calculation. Appraisers should use market values
of debt/ equity ratios (not the book value
debt/ equity ratios) from comparable
companies in normal circumstances.
For distressed indusbies, however, this
approach can no longer be used.
The debt/equity ratios for distressed
indusbies are distorted dramatically too
high. Often the equity values plunge,
frequently well over 90%. Most debt is
not publicly traded, but market value
usually falls dramatically, as illustrated in
tlle Calpine example above. As a result,
book values dramatically overstate tlle
value of debt. Even if tlle market value
oftlle debtis obta:inable, tlle debt/equity
ratio is not relevant. Value is tlle price
between a willing buyer and a willing
seller in an arm's-length transaction.
The debt! equity ratios of existing comparable companies reflect debt obtained
in better times. It is often very difficult
for a potential buyer to obtain debt for
a purchase in a distressed industry at
all, let alone on tlle terms the industry
received in better times.
Determining the WACC
To determine the cost of capital for
a potential buyer, the appraiser must
detennine the amount of debt and the
terms a buyer could obtain for tlle distressed asset at the time of the purchase.
An appraiser should not use a buyer's
own cost of debt for this number; this
debt is often secured by other assets. To
value a property, an appraiser cannot
directly or indirectly use assets outside of
tlle asset appraised. The appraiser must
determine how much debt and on what
terms debt is available for tlle subject
property on a nonrecourse basis, that is,
on a stand-alone basis witllout recourse
to otller assets as collateral.
In practice, tlle buyer must visit a num-
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bel' of potential debtholders, present the
facts of the asset itself, and effectively
sell the debt. To do this, the buyer must
present credible forecasts of revenues
and expenses to the potential purchasers of the debt securities. Debtholders
carefully look at, among other items,
the forecasted Earnings Before Interest
Taxes Depreciation and Amortization
(EBITDA) as a measure of cash flow
available to pay interest. They then compute ratios of de bt service to cash flow to
determine the risk of the debt. Table 5
shows ratios for various grades of debt.
These ratios usually determine the
amount of debt and/or the credit rating that a purchaser of the distressed
property could obtain on the property.
For example, if the purchaser desires a
BBB rating, then the forecasted EBITDA
should be about 5.5 times the interest on
the amount of debt requested. This fact
limits the amount of debt obtainable.
For example, suppose that a distressed
property has the cash flow forecast of
table 4 and fixed costs include $1 million
of depreciation. EBITDA is

$8 million + $1 million =$9 million.
Suppose too that table 6 reflects capital
market data for interest rates on vmious
grades of debt at the time of the appraisal.
The appraiser might estimate that
the distressed property is able to obtain
a BBB rating on 20-yem- debt if debt
represents 60% ofthe capital structure.

According to table 6, BBB-rated debt for
U.S. indusbials costs 7.46%. Suppose
the appraiser estimates that the equity
investors require a 20% return (to be
discussed later) for the remaining 40%
of capital. The resulting WAGG is

.6

X

7.46%

X

(1 - .4) +.4

X

.20

=10.68%.

At this discount rate, the value of the
property is

$4.8 million/.1 068 = $44.9 million.
Using the estimated 60% debt/capital
ratio, this implies that

60%

X

$44.9 million =$27 million

of debt would be utilized. Assuming the
BBB rating on 20-year debt is obtained,
this implies that

$27 million

X

7.46% = $2.01 million

in interest would be payable. However,
this would imply an interest coverage
of only

EBITDAIinterest =$9 million/$2.01

=4.5.

This is probably not sufficient to obtain
the BBB rating based on the ratios in
table 5, which indicates that the EBITDA
coverage ratio needs to be about 5.5 for
the debt to qualify for a BBB ratingespecially for a property in a distressed
industry.
As a result, the appraiser must revisit
the assumption that 60 % debt is obtainable.
If the appraiser now estimates that
debt has to be limited to 50% of capital

Table 5. Adjusted Key Industrial Financial Ratios, Long-Term Debt
Three-year (1999-2001) Medians
AA
BBB
AAA
A
EBIT interest coverage (x)
11.4
3.8
23.1
6.2
EBITDA interest coverage (x)
5.5
24.0
14.3
8.5
FFO/total debt (%)
152.3
62.2
31.0
44.1
Free oper. cash flow/total debt (%) 97.3
9.3
27.6
17.5
14.5
Return on capital (%)
40.7 23.5
18.5
Oper. income/sales (%)
21.0
18.5
16.1
25.0
Long-term debt/capital (%)
23.0
41.5
4.4
33.3
Total debt/capital (%)
47.9
4.5
34.1
42.9
No. of companies per rating category 7
27
119
227

BB

B

2.2
0.9
3.1
1.7
18.8
9.6
4.3
(0.3)
11.5
7.4
17.1
14.2
56.4 73.6
59.8 76.0
256
277

eee

0.1
0.9
2.0
(4.5)
0.5
11.1
59.8
75.7
31

Source: Wesley Chinn, 2002, Corporate Ratings Criteria Book and CreditStats. Material is reproduced
with permission of Standard & Poor's, a division of The McGraw-Hili Companies, Inc.
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tCY obtain'the BBB rating and that, as a
result of the lower leverage, equity holders are willing to accept a return of18%,
the new WAGG becomes

.50

X

7.46% X (1-.4) + .50

X

18% = 11.24%.

At this new WAGG, value becomes

$4.8 million/.1124 = $42.7 million.
At the assumed 50% debt/capital ratio,
the amount of debt necessary falls to

50% X $42.7 million = $21.4 million.
At the assumed BBB rating, the amount
of interest payable falls to

$21.4 million X 7.46% = $1.59 million.
At this amount, the EBITDA interest
coverage ratio becomes

EBITDAIinterest = $9 million I $1.59 million =
5.5,
which would probably qualify for the
BBB rating according to table 5.
These calculations have focused on the
EBITDA/interest ratio since it is usually
the most critical benchmark for determining the credit rating, but in practice,
of course, the other ratios also have to
be checked for reasonableness.
Determining a reasonable cost of
equity is particularly problematic. For
distressed properties there are only
a handful of potential investors. Unfo~tunately there is no 'direct method
for determining the cost of equity for
distressed properties. The appraiser
would have to contact private equity
portfolios or other potential investors
Table 6.

to obtain direct evidence of reasonable
discount rates. Using a formula such as
the Gapital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM)
directly usually results in poor estimates
because the dislocation in tlle industry
usually causes tlle stock prices to behave
erratically. As a result, the beta estimates
needed for the GAPM from traded
"comparable companies" are very unreliable. Scanning current finance trade
journals can often provide evidence of
the rates of return required by private
equity investors in high-risk properties.
As a benchmark, returns for equity
investment are currently 20% or more
for turnaround and highly leveraged
transactions. For particularly high-risk
investments, such as venture capital, required rates of return in excess of 25 %
are not unusual.
Summary
Determining the value of distressed
properties is one of tlle most difficult
pro blems for an appraiser. Old benchmarles are no longer reliable; stock and
debt market data often produce bizarre
numbers; and few transactions can be
drawn upon for market data.
In such a situation, the appraiser must
return to basic principles: make a credible forecast of cash flows (EBITDA),
estimate how much debt is obtainable
and at what rates based on the forecasted EBITDA, estimate a cost of equity
given the amount of debt, determine
the WAGG, and tllen use tlle WAGG to
estimate value.

Treasury and Corporate BondYields

Maturity
5
10
15
20
25

Treasurys
3.01
4.05
4.31
4.56
4.81

AAA

3.75
4.98
5.34
5.66
5.97

-U.S. IndustrialsBBB BB+
AA
A
3.96 4.43 6.21 9.07
5.17 5.64 7.14 9.82
5.52 5.98 7.32 9.90
5.84 6.30 7.52 NA
6.14 6.61 NA ' NA

BB/BB-

8.76
10.29

NA
NA
NA

-U.S. UtilityA
BBB
4.80
6.65
5.93
7.47
6.23
7.59
6.52
NA

NA

NA

*Note: Data as of 1211712002. U.S. Industrials include Yankee bond issues.
Minimum $100 ml'llipn outstanding.
Source: Global Fixed Income Research Department, and Creditweek Publication (December 17, 2002
and January 1, 2003). Material is reproduced with permission of Standard & Poor's, a division of The
McGraw-Hili Companies, Inc.
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Following tilis determination of value, market for such properties witilout being
tile appraiser must check tile standard able to rely on many-if any-transacratios at tile estimated numbers to deter- tions for basic data. The appraiser must
mine whetiler tile ratios are compatible compile dataf-rom transactions as similar
Witil CUlTent ratios in tile market. If tile as can be found and tilen present tile
ratios are witilin a reasonable range of tile existing evidence for tile reasonableness
market, tile appraiser can feel comfort- of the estimates.
able tilat tile valuation is reasonable. If
not, tile appraiser must adjust tile estimat- Reference
ed amount of debt and/ or credit rating
and repeat tile process until tile ratios are Black, F., and M. Scholes. 1973. The pricing of options and corporate liabilities.
compatible Witil market requirements.
Detennining value in distressed mar- The JouTnal oj Political Economy 81 (Maykets requires understanding tile cUlTent June); 637-654.
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